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BOOK REVIEWS 

LEGAL RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE. By Stanley S. Herr, 
Stephen Arons, and Richard E. Wallace, Jr. Lexington, Ma.: Lex­
ington Books 1983. 
Reviewed by Robert D. Fleischner*. 
In recent years there has been both a growing recognition that 
people with menta] disabilities have legal rights) and an almost ex­
ponential growth of their rights. But, as one· court has recognized, 
"[w]ith no mechanism for assisting mentally disabled persons in en­
forcing them, these rights might as well not exisC'2. 
A critical issue, then, is how to transform the promise of new 
rights into reality. Perhaps the most obvious way is to insure that the 
professionals and paraprofessionals, the primary providers of serv­
ices to mentally disabled people, are aware of their clients' rights and 
are in a position to act to procure or protect those rights or to find 
someone who can. It is apparently to that end thai Stanley S. Herr, 
Stephen Arons and Richard E. Wallace, Jr. have written their new 
book, Legal Rights and Mental Health Care.3 The book isiinportant, 
however, because it is something more than just a helpful 4eskman­
ual for mental health workers. It is an attempt to make those work­
ers more comfortable with the very idea of legal rights for their 
• Assistant Director. Center for Public Representation. Northampton. MA; Super­
visory Attorney. Disability Law Clinic. Western New England College School of Law. 
B.A.• University of Massachusetts. Amherst. 1967; J.D.• Boston College School of Law. 
1973. 
1. We have. after all. recently completed. with remarkably little fanfare. the Na­
tional Year of Disabled Persons (1982). 
2. Brewster v. Dukakis. 520 F. Supp. 882. 889 (D. Mass. 1981). rev'd and remanded 
on other grounds. 687 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1982). 
3. S. HERR. S. ARONS & R. WALLACE. LEGAL RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH 
CARE (expected publication Spring 1983). Stanley Herr is a noted advocate and com­
mentator on the rights of people with mental handicaps. Professor Arons and Attorney 
Wallace were once associated with the Mental Patients Advocacy Project. an independ­
ent law office on the grounds of the Northampton State Hospital," Northampton, 
Massachusetts. 
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clients and with the role and place of advocates in the mental health 
system. 
Although "advocacy" is widely believed to be among the most 
powerful weapons in the limited arsenal available to people with 
handicapping conditions,4 the very concept of "advocacy" is the sub­
ject of some broad disagreementS and fundamental misunderstand­
ing. The word "advocacy" itself often seems to mean all things to all 
people. For instance, in some residential programs and group 
homes, the staff are called "advocates"; there is a growing "self-ad­
vocacy" movement in which groups of formerly institutionalized 
people come together to assert their rights from a position of 
strength; Associations for Retarded Citizens, in particular, promote 
programs of "citizen advocacy" which encourage friend relation­
ships between an unpaid citizen and a person with retardation; pro­
fessional and parent groups hold themselves out as "advocates" for 
various disabled people; individual service providers, professional or 
otherwise, define their role, in whole or part, as that of "client advo­
cates";6 many human rights committees view their work as "client 
advocacy"; and even a state agency may have its mission defined as 
that of an "advocate."7 Consequently, it is not unusual, although it 
can be disconcerting. to attend a meeting concerning services for a 
person with handicaps at which all the participants announce them­
selves to be that person's advocate but promptly proceed to espouse 
diametrically opposite views about the person and his or her needs 
and desires.8 
The confusion this causes is not necessarily the result of any­
4. See, e.g .• S. HERR. THE NEW CLIENTS: LEGAL SERVICES FOR MENTALLY RE­
TARDED PERSONS (1979); Legal Advocacy for Persons Confined in Mental Hospilals, 5 
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 274 (1981) ("point-counterpoint" exchange between Sa­
muel J. Brakel, research attorney with the American Bar Foundation and Steven J. 
Schwartz and Robert D. Fleischner, attorneys with the Mental Patients Advocacy Pro­
ject, Northampton, Massachusetts). 
5. E.g., Legal Advocacy for Persons Confined in MenIal Hospilals, supra note 4. 
6. For instance. the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health has argued that 
its program of providing its clients with "service coordinators" or "case managers" fully 
satisfies the client's advocacy needs. Brewster v. Dukakis, 520 F. Supp. 882, 891 (D. 
Mass. 1981). rev'd and remanded on olher grounds, 687 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1982); see also J. 
WESTMAN, CHILD ADVOCACY: NEW PROFESSIONAL RULES FOR HELPING FAMILIES 
(1979) (arguing that advocacy should be added to the job descriptions of all planners and 
providers of services). 
7. See, e.g .• MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 28A, §§ 3-4 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982). 
which created the Office for Children. a state agency charged with acting as an "advo­
cate" for children in Massachusetts. 
8. It is all too seldom that the disabled person is allowed to attend and thereby 
straighten out the confusion. To its credit. the Massachusetts Department of Mental 
591 1983) BOOK REVIEW 
thing evil. In fact, it is probably the product of a growing recogni­
tion across the various professional disciplines· and, indeed, 
throughout our society, that human dignity and legal rights are at 
least as important to people with handicapping conditions as they 
are to the rest of us. But the benevolent motivations of this broadly 
defined community of advocates are not enough, in themselves, to 
relieve the confusion, lessen the inevitable professional tensions, or 
necessarily to result in anything meaningful for the client. The most 
obvious problem caused by all of this is that far too much energy 
and time are wasted in arguments about who speaks for whom, from 
what professional, moral, or ethical perspective, and with what grant 
of authority.9 
Of course, "advocates" are people wJ:~,o work within the mental 
health care delivery system itself. But ironically, as Herr, Arons, and 
Wallace recognize, the most serious threat to patients' human rights 
lies in the highly bureaucratized settings in which mental health care 
is often organized. Since nearly every important decision about a 
mentally disabled person's life will be made from within the context 
of that bureaucracy, there can be palpable discord when an 
"outside" advocate intrudes and demands either something more 
than the bureaucracy is willing to grant or something the bureau­
cracy believes not to be in its client's "best interest." Consequently, 
the "advocates" are often at each other's throats. 
The situation just described need not be so. With the publica­
tion of their book, Herr and his colleagues have taken asizeable step 
toward the reduction, though hardly the elimination, of these poten­
tially destructive misunderstandings. Legal Rights and Menial 
Health Care is an up-to-date, comprehensive, readable, and copi­
ously documented work which explains the authors' views of the role 
of "outside" primarily legal, advocates and the tools-their client's 
. legal rights-with which they labor. Since the book's intended audi­
ence is mental health professionals, it is written without the legalese 
which that audience can find so troubling. Nevertheless, the mate­
rial will be of value to lawyers, clients, and interested citizens as well. 
For the greater part of the book, the authors have carefully sur­
veyed and explained most of the important legal rights which affect 
the lives of people labeled as mentally ill. In this regard, it is partic-
Health has promulgated regulations mandating client attendance at so-called "Individual 
Service Planning" meetings. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 104. §§ 16.05(2), 21.46 (\980). 
9. Such internecine struggles. of course, are nothing new. See Wald & Freidman, 
The Politics ofMental Health Advocacy in the United States. I INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 
137 (1978). 
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ularly encouraging and somewhat innovative that the rights of cli­
ents of community programs are given space and treatment equal to 
that of their institutionalized counterparts. The chapters on the right 
to treatment,IO the right to refuse treatment, II the special problems 
and rights of children, the principle of the least restrictive alterna­
tive,12 issues of privacy, confidentiality and access to records, anti­
discrimination laws, and guardianship and other protective services 
are quite excellent. The chapters are filled with information that 
should be of great value to clinician and lawyer alike. 13 But aside 
from the usefulness of these informative chapters, the book's more 
deeply obvious value lies in the authors' efforts to interpret the na­
ture of advocacy, to illuminate the difficult concepts of competency 
and consent, and to explain why it is that mental patients' rights 
should be taken seriously. 
In what may be their most provocative chapter, the authors de­
scribe what they believe to be fundamental principles which must be 
maintained if advocacy is to be true to its own ethics and useful to its 
clients. For the authors, the cardinal principle is that the advocate's 
sole loyalty is to his or her client. In practice, this largely inflexible 
rule is often the one which troubles mental health professionals be­
cause they must often "balance their loyalty to their clients with bu­
reaucratic demands, programatic responsibilities and professional 
10. The Supreme Court's recent and discouragingly narrow decision in Youngberg 
v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982), is fully analyzed in this chapter. 
I J. The chapter on the right to refuse treatment compares the decision in Rennie v. 
Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) with Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 
1979), affd in pari rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub 
nom., Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982). 
The Rogers case is currently pending before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa­
chusetts upon certification of questions from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
The certified questions involve, inter alia, the status of Massachusetts law regarding insti­
tutionalized mental patients in light of a Supreme Judicial Court decision establishing 
that mentally ill people living in the community have a right to refuse psychotropic medi­
cation. In re Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). See 
5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 565 (1983). Therefore, through no fault of the authors, this 
chapter may well be out of date not long after it is published. 
12. This chapter is a useful and accurate description of the lengthy litigation in 
Brewster v. Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F, (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 1978) (Consent Decree). 544 F. 
Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1982) (describing decree and awarding fees). 
13. Many mental health professionals may be disappointed that the book gives 
such brief coverage to questions of professional liability . The only issue addressed in this 
regard is that of confidentiality and the dangerous client. Many clinicians are concerned 
about whether they are likely to be sued for what they do or fail to do. Nevertheless. this 
book is about the rights of the client; "clinicians' rights" should be, and are. addressed 
elsewhere. See, e.g., A. VAN BIERVllET & I. SHELDON- WILGEN. LIABILITY ISSUES 1/\ 
COMMUNITY BASED PROGRAMS (1981). 
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judgments that what the client wants may not be what the client 
needs." 14 Yet without the rule, both advocate and client are lost. 
The authors carefully and clearly explain the overriding need for 
confidentiality and trust in the advocate-client relationship and show 
that to maintain that trust, the advocate cannot serve two masters. 
Since probably few clinicians would want to define their rule in very 
different terms, this account is a helpful point of departure for a 
deeper understanding of the advocate's role. . 
Similarly, the authors believe that the advocate can function ef­
fectively only if he or she works from a presumption of client auton­
omy. This presumption means that the advocate should follow the 
expressed wishes of the client and must regard the client as a person 
possessed of all of the legal rights of any other citizen. 15 Since most 
clinicians are trained to look behind the expressed wishes of their 
clients to find the "true" or "deeper" meaning of what is being said, 
this presumption is for them a particularly difficult one to fathom. 
The advocate's emphasis on "rights" and "autonomy" may be main­
tained, from the clinician's view at least, at the expense of the client's 
health, sanity, safety, or best interest. The resulting conflict between 
the lawyer-advocate and the clinician-advocate can be spirited. The 
authors are honest with their readers and recognize that there is 
probably no way to eliminate this tension, short of one side or the 
other either fundamentally altering its professional ethic or getting 
out of the business altogether. Probably the best result would be a 
deeper mutual understanding of the differences in professional ori­
entation and a more quiet debate in an atmosphere that recognizes 
the full extent of shared goals; one that ultimately leads to something 
of value to the client. 16 
14. Nor is the most conscientious advocate necessarily free from counterveiling 
pressures. For instance, some advocacy offices may choose not to represent clients in­
volved in a panicular kind of case, (e.g. medication refusals), so as not to rock the institu­
tional boat. Brakel, LegalAid in Mental Hospitals, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 23. 
63. Even those advocates who avoid such obvious co-optation cannot help but have their 
effons subtly affected by their own values, their need to preserve their own mental health 
and their desire to assure the future of their project. Thus, it is well wonh striving for the 
authors' overriding goal of "sole loyalty" as a criteria for choosing among cases. 
15. The authors of Legal Rights and MenIal Health Care recognize, as they must, 
that these presumptions are overcome by a legal declaration of incompetency, such as the 
appointment of a guardian. 
16. The other fundamental principles of advocacy discussed by tbe authors are: 
confidentiality of communication between client and advocate; an attitude of profession­
alism t0ward mental health staff and systems; regular and dependable physical access to 
clients; and the ability and willingness to pursue the full range of remedies for a client's 
complaint. 
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Legal Rights and Mental Health Care is a positive step forward 
in that process. The book's essential morality, that mental patients 
have a right to dignity and to be treated like human beings, cannot 
be denied. The essential ideal, that mentally handicapped people 
can benefit from assertive advocacy, is likewise beyond dispute. Yet 
its essential hope, that all the professionals, including advocates, who 
have such inordinate power over the lives of handicapped people 
will be able to labor for the client in an atmosphere of compassion, 
mutual trust and understanding, remains unfullfilled. 
